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Recent years have seen a surge in economic integration 
agreements (EIAs) and the development of non-tarif 
measures (NTMs). As a consequence, a growing number 
of EIAs include provisions on NTMs. However, little 
attention has been given in the literature to the efects 
of NTM liberalization in the context of EIAs. In this 
paper, we focus on provisions for technical regulations 
and analyze whether the North-South harmonization 
of technical barriers afects international trade. Using a 
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gravity equation, it tests whether, as a result of the deep 
integration associated with standards provisions included 
in the EIA, the Southern partners’ trade expands with 
the North, but at the expense of their trade with non-
bloc Southern partners. Empirical results provide strong 
support for this conjecture. Moreover, harmonization 
on the basis of regional standards negatively impacts the 
exports of developing countries to the North.
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1. Introduction  
Two emerging features of the changing patterns of trade integration suggest that the impact of 
specific provisions included in Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) should be 
reconsidered from a broader perspective than traditional trade diversion and creation. First, 
tariffs on goods have been extensively bound and reduced to an average below 5%, whereas 
technical, sanitary, and regulatory measures at the border have spread. Second, it is often 
argued that progress is more easily achieved within EIAs with regard to deep trade 
liberalization because the multilateral scene has become too heterogeneous to converge easily 
on ambitious and mutually beneficial liberalization agendas. These two trends reinforce each 
other: the agenda of trade negotiations has shifted from tariffs to more complex issues that are 
hardly addressed in the multilateral arena, and EIAs offer a more versatile negotiating 
environment.  
Seen this way, EIAs have become vehicles to open up ambitious negotiation agendas 
that cover a wide range of border and behind-the-border measures and whose trade impact can 
no longer be viewed through the traditional lens of trade creation and trade diversion 
consecutive to tariff phase-outs. Non-tariff measures and their harmonization, including (inter 
alia) product standards and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, feature prominently in 
those agendas, albeit with varying degrees of success in terms of real achievements. 
As highlighted by Bourgeois et al. (2007), little attention has been given in the 
literature to the effect of standards liberalization in the context of EIAs. The existing literature 
(see, among others, Czubala et al. 2009; Moenius 2004; Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren 
2006) focuses on the trade effects of standards – often distinguishing between country-
specific and internationally harmonized standards – but does not examine whether these 
effects interact with the presence of EIAs. 
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A first issue relating to the inclusion of standards provisions in EIAs concerns 
integration among high-income countries; namely, whether the mutual recognition of 
standards leads to different outcomes than their harmonization. Chen and Mattoo (2008) show 
that both standards harmonization and mutual recognition (with or without rules of origin) 
significantly increase the probability and volume of intra-regional trade between developed 
countries. However, the effect is larger for mutual-recognition agreements, especially those 
without rules of origin, than for harmonization agreements.  
A second set of issues arises with North-South agreements. Here, the tension between 
liberalizing trade and introducing new distortions is even greater. Because technical 
regulations are typically more stringent in high-income countries, either de jure or de facto 
(through stricter enforcement), what is at stake in such EIAs is a convergence of standards to 
the more stringent Northern ones and their adoption by developing countries. There is 
abundant literature on the standards divide (Wilson and Abiola 2003) that indicates the 
potential detrimental effects of high-income countries’ standards on exports from developing 
economies (Otsuki et al. 2001). However, the way in which the adoption of Northern 
standards by Southern countries—when they manage to match them—affects trade patterns 
remains an open question. This is the question addressed in this paper. 
Notwithstanding the standard divide, the compliance of the Southern partner with 
Northern standards in an EIA can confer indirect benefits by raising the quality of exported 
products and encouraging improved management and production processes (see Maertens and 
Swinnen (2009) for an example in Senegalese agriculture). However, these benefits typically 
come at a cost, even if that cost is sometimes reduced by technical-assistance programs such 
as the European Pesticides Initiative Program, and the higher cost and changed market 
positioning may price those exports out of other Southern markets. The Southern partner will 
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then redirect its exports to the Northern partner, a trade deflection that may hurt actual or 
potential South-South trade.  
The size of this trade deflection is an empirical question that depends, inter alia, on 
how specific and stringent the standards are. When the Northern partner’s standard is 
idiosyncratic (national or regional), the Southern partner’s adaptation to that particular 
standard may make it costlier to also produce for other markets with different standards or, at 
least, may not help in those markets. For instance, adopting a standard imposed by the 
European Union (EU) does not necessarily facilitate clearance of the product in the United 
States (US). This effect may be mitigated when harmonization takes place on the basis of 
international standards. Although there is no theoretical argument establishing a cost 
hierarchy to standards and regional standards are not necessarily costlier to implement than 
international ones, a number of papers (see, e.g., Otsuki et al. 2001; Wilson and Otsuki 2004) 
have empirically shown that international standards are less trade-inhibiting than domestic or 
regional ones, with a smaller negative trade impact and even, in some cases, a positive one.
1
   
Accordingly, the main objective of our paper is to assess whether the liberalization of 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs) in North-South EIAs contributes to reinforcing hub-and-
spoke trade patterns centered on large Northern blocs, which are potentially damaging for 
South-South trade integration. Put differently, the hypothesis is that as a result of the deep 
integration associated with standards provisions included in the EIA, the Southern partners’ 
trade expands with the North, but at the expense of their trade with non-bloc Southern 
partners. The net effect of these two opposite forces is a priori indeterminate and subject to 
empirical estimation.  
                                                 
1
 However, there are counterexamples where even international standards impose adaptation costs that stifle 
trade. For instance, Jensen and Keyser (2012) show how the adoption by the East African Community of dairy 
standards based on the international Codex Alimentarius led to requirements so tight that regional trade in dairy 
products was largely stifled. 
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Unlike classical trade diversion, the trade deflection studied in this paper has 
theoretically ambiguous welfare implications for two main reasons. First, to the extent that the 
Southern partner’s producers adapt their entire production processes to Northern standards, 
negative externalities on health or the environment may be reduced, with positive welfare 
effects. However, the adoption of Northern standards may raise the production costs and 
prices in the South and may therefore be welfare-reducing. In this paper, we limit our analysis 
to trade patterns and refrain from drawing welfare implications. 
A standard gravity framework is used to systematically investigate how provisions on 
standards included in North-South EIAs impact North-South and South-South international 
trade. This equation is estimated both for trade in goods as a whole and for manufactured 
products only because the impact of TBTs may differ between manufactured and agricultural 
products. The identification of classical trade-diversion effects in a gravity equation relies on 
changes in importing countries’ trade patterns, with imports from third countries replaced by 
within-bloc imports (see, e.g., Carrère 2006). By contrast, our identification of deflection 
effects relies on changes in exporting countries’ trade patterns because our conjecture relies 
on a cost-raising effect rather than a tariff-preference one. 
Empirical results provide strong support for our conjecture. Standards harmonization 
in North-South EIAs hurts South-South trade. Moreover, harmonization on the basis of 
regional standards negatively impacts the exports of developing countries to the North. The 
computation of the net effect of standards harmonization on Southern countries’ exports is 
outside the scope of this paper. However, this net effect is likely to be negative, on average. 
To obtain a net positive effect, North-South harmonization of technical barriers within EIAs 
should take place on an international basis, and the magnitude of its positive effect on North-
South trade should be higher than its negative impact on South-South trade. Standards 
harmonization on an international basis is welfare superior to that on a regional basis for two 
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main reasons. First, international standards are usually less restrictive than regional ones, and 
the cost of their adoption is therefore smaller. Second, their adoption expands the potential 
destinations that exporters can serve. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section surveys the literature to 
highlight our contribution. Section 3 describes the TBT provisions included in North-South 
EIAs. Section 4 presents our econometric specification and data. The results are discussed in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
In an early contribution, Baldwin (2000) examined different routes toward standard 
liberalization and argued that mutual recognition among developed countries could lead to a 
two-tier international trade system, with developing countries in the second tier. Since then, 
the literature, mostly empirical, has developed along two strands. 
A first strand examines standards provisions in several EIAs and investigates whether 
they go beyond the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on TBT. These papers do 
not quantify the trade impact of this regional liberalization. Covering 28 EIAs where the EU 
or the US is a partner, Horn et al. (2009) show that all but two US agreements include TBT 
provisions. Furthermore, for five EU and 11 US agreements, these provisions are legally 
enforceable, meaning that the agreement specifies clear legal obligations, which are more 
likely to be implemented.  
Piermartini and Budetta (2009) survey 58 EIAs with TBT provisions. They carefully 
analyze the legal text of these EIAS and scrutinize whether the TBT provisions refer to the 
WTO TBT agreement and whether regional liberalization of TBTs through harmonization or 
mutual recognition is pursued. They also examine transparency requirements, institutional and 
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administrative frameworks, and cooperation between members on TBTs. Their study provides 
rich information. For instance, harmonization appears to be frequently used for standards and 
technical regulations, whereas mutual recognition is favored for conformity assessment 
procedures. Moreover, EIAs signed by the US promote the mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment procedures, whereas EIAs signed by the EU also frequently promote further 
harmonization of technical regulations. In view of this last observation, Piermartini and 
Budetta (2009) raise the issue of whether regional harmonization might lock countries into 
EIAs, hampering multilateral trade liberalization. However, they do not test their conjecture. 
Lesser (2007) extends Piermartini and Budetta’s (2009) mapping to 82 EIAs, with a special 
focus on Chile, Singapore, and Morocco. 
A second strand of the literature seeks to quantify the trade effects of agreements 
covering standards and uncovers potentially damaging effects for developing countries, in 
accordance with Baldwin’s intuition. Chen and Mattoo (2008) examine regional standards 
liberalization through harmonization and mutual recognition agreements between industrial 
countries, controlling for the presence of rules of origin in the latter case. On the basis of a 
sample covering disaggregated manufacturing trade flows between 42 countries (28 OECD 
and 14 non-OECD countries) over 1986–2000, they find that harmonization fosters trade 
between member countries but reduces it with the rest of the world. Mutual recognition with 
rules of origin has a qualitatively similar effect, whereas mutual recognition without rules of 
origin increases trade both within and outside the bloc.  
Baller (2007) studies the trade impact on both member and non-member countries of 
TBT liberalization through mutual-recognition and harmonization agreements. Her analysis 
includes North-North, North-South, and South-South agreements and uses a two-stage gravity 
estimation for two sectors: Telecom equipment and medical devices. She finds that mutual-
recognition agreements significantly increase the probability and volume of trade for member 
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countries. Interestingly, third-party developed countries outside the bloc also benefit from 
harmonization, whereas third-party developing countries do not.  
Reyes (2011, 2012) provides a possible explanation for Baller’s result. Using detailed 
firm-level data, he shows that the harmonization of the EU’s electronics standards on 
international ones in the 1990s induced entry by new US exporters, making the market more 
competitive and encouraging trade (in this case, with a Northern non-member). However, this 
change in market structure was accompanied by a retrenchment by Southern exporters on the 
EU markets, damaging trade with Southern non-members. It is difficult to ascertain the 
mechanism that induced this substitution, but one conjecture is that the EU market became 
tougher, inducing the exit of weaker Southern players. 
Note that the presence of standards arrangement does not necessarily define EIAs. For 
instance, the EU and US have agreed to mutual recognition of pharmaceutical products 
without this recognition being part of an FTA. The agreement’s objective is mutual 
recognition of technical standards and of conformity-assessment procedures. Using a Tobit 
model over 1990–2004, Amurgo-Pacheco (2006) shows that the mutual recognition 
agreement harmed third-country exports, irrespective of their level of development.  
The bottom line of this literature review is that harmonization of standards within 
EIAs has an impact on trade that can be detrimental to third countries’ exports, particularly 
developing ones. However, our opening question, whether the provisions on standards 
harmonization included in North-South trade agreement are detrimental to the integration of 
Southern countries in the world economy, remains an open issue.  
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3. TBT provisions in North-South EIAs 
To what extent do harmonization clauses in North-South EIAs constrain the regulatory 
flexibility of Southern countries? There is no single answer to that question because TBT 
harmonization clauses in EIAs vary widely in their intent and wording. Broadly speaking, 
there is a continuum of degrees of stringency, ranging from agreements where the Northern 
partner clearly expects the Southern one to align its domestic regulations to other agreements 
with rather loose cooperation clauses. This diversity suggests that Northern countries do not 
have “RTA models” that they tend to negotiate with all of their Southern partners. 
In cases where EIAs are part of broad-ranging partnerships, they can include strong 
suggestions that the Southern country should seek to harmonize all of its domestic product 
regulations on that partner’s own regulations and build the necessary institutions. For 
instance, Article 51 of the European Community (EC)-Morocco EIA states, 
“The Parties shall cooperate in developing: (a) the use of Community rules in 
standardisation, metrology, quality control and conformity assessment; (b) the 
updating of Moroccan laboratories, leading eventually to the conclusion of mutual 
recognition agreements for conformity assessment; (c) the bodies responsible for 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property and for standardisation and quality 
in Morocco.” 
Article 51 of the EC-Tunisia EIA is identical. Article 40 of the EC-Palestinian 
Authority EIA contains a harmonization clause worded in similar language. In such cases, it 
seems to be the intention of EU negotiators to encourage partners to adopt EC regulations 
even for products aimed at domestic or other, non-EU export markets. 
EU trade agreements with countries with which the EU has less ambitious cooperation 
agendas contain less stringent clauses on TBTs, although sometimes one can detect a whiff of 
the same intention. For instance, Article 18 of the EC-Chile agreement states, “Cooperation 
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between the Parties will seek to promote efforts in (a) regulatory cooperation; (b) 
compatibility of technical regulations on the basis of international and European standards” 
[italics added].  
Neither the EC-Mexico nor the EC-Egypt agreements contain any suggestion of that 
type. Instead, harmonization is expected to take place on the basis of international standards. 
For instance, Article 19 of the EC-Mexico merely states that the Parties “shall work towards: 
[…] (c) promoting the use of international standards, technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures on the basis of international agreements.” Similar clauses can be found 
in other North-South agreements (see, for instance, Article 705 of the Australia-Thailand 
EIA). However, there is a nuance in the scope of harmonization. In the latter case (Australia-
Thailand), Chapter 7, to which Article 705 belongs, applies to “all goods traded between the 
parties”, implying that goods not traded bilaterally could potentially remain uncovered. No 
such scope limitation can be found in the EC-Mexico clause on harmonization. Therefore, if 
one accepts the idea that even when the letter of the agreement does not prescribe 
convergence on the Northern standard, de facto, this is what is likely to happen. The EC-
Mexico harmonization clause can be considered more encompassing than the Australia-
Thailand one, which leaves regulations that are irrelevant to bilateral trade outside the 
agreement’s scope. Similar scope limitations can be found, for example, in Article 7.2 of the 
US-CAFTA (Dominican Republic – Central America) agreement and in Article 7.1 of the 
US-Bahrain agreement. 
Most of the EIAs included in our database that contain a harmonization clause involve 
the EU. What is involved for Southern partners is the translation of EU regulations and 
directives in national legislation to align domestic standards on EU ones. This process may 
involve, for instance, the adoption of EU food-contact regulations for plastic containers, 
which mandates the exclusive use of certain monomers and additives from a specified list, or 
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the adoption of EU energy-saving specifications for insulating foams used in construction. 
For Moroccan producers exporting to the EU, compliance is mandatory with or without 
harmonization. It is for those selling domestically that harmonization changes things. If they 
are also selling to third markets where compliance with EU regulations confers no 
competitive advantage, making production lines compliant (it is not always possible to keep 
separate production lines, particularly for sensitive products such as food containers) may 
involve additional costs and reduce competitiveness in third markets with no offsetting 
advantage.       
Regardless of whether Southern alignment on Northern regulations is explicitly called 
for in the text of the agreement, we assume in the rest of this paper that the ability of Southern 
producers to freely choose their technical specifications is always constrained, one way or 
another, by the existence of a TBT harmonization clause in a North-South EIA. When the 
harmonization of domestic regulations is not explicitly called for, the argument is essentially 
related to production lines—that once the Southern-based producer has been forced to adapt 
its production processes to Northern regulations for products bound for that market, it is likely 
to adopt the same processes for all of its production to avoid separate production chains and 
higher fixed costs. When those processes are costlier due to stringent Northern regulations, 
one can expect the Southern country’s trade flows to be affected with all partners.  
4. Econometric Specification and data 
This section addresses the impact of TBT provisions in North-South EIAs on Southern 
countries’ trade. We aim to identify the deviation from “normal” bilateral trade patterns of 
countries that have signed such agreements. This question has two separate components. First, 
what is the impact of a North-South EIA with harmonization on the Southern member’s trade 
with other Southern countries? Second, what is the impact on the Southern member’s trade 
with its Northern partner?  
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4.1 Econometric specification 
The gravity equation provides an appropriate framework for such an analysis. As is 
well known, the gravity equation can be considered a reduced form of the theoretical trade 
flow prediction based on the combination of the importer’s budget allocation and a market-
clearing condition for the exporter. Our theoretical foundation for trade patterns is the 
standard monopolistic competition-CES demand-Iceberg trade costs model introduced by 
Krugman (1980) and used by many others since then.
2
 Producers operating under increasing 
returns in each country produce differentiated varieties that they ship, at a cost, to consumers 
in all countries. Following Redding and Venables (2004), the total value xijt of exports from 
country i to country j in year t can be written as follows:  
(1)                                 )(
111 −−−= σσσ
jtjtijtititijt
PYTpnx , 
where nit and pit are the number of varieties and prices in country i in year t, Yjt, and Pjt is the 
expenditure and price index of country j in year t. Tijt represents the iceberg transport costs in 
year t. 
Several identification issues must be addressed (see Head and Mayer (2013) for a 
detailed review of gravity estimation methods and issues). First, OLS estimation of (1) 
excludes zero lines and therefore raises a potential selection issue. One way to address zero 
flows consists of using a two-stage estimation procedure. The decision to export is estimated 
in the first stage, whereas the second stage focuses on the value of exports. The Heckman 
model is often used in the trade literature. However, in the presence of fixed effects in the first 
                                                 
2
 Alternative theoretical foundations of the gravity equations include very different assumptions: perfect 
competition with technology differences as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), monopolistic competition with different 
functional forms as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), or heterogeneous firms operating in a Dixit–Stiglitz 
environment as in Chaney (2008). All of these, however, yield a strictly equivalent estimable specification for 
our purpose. 
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stage, the Heckman model leads to the incidental parameter problem. Helpman et al. (2008) 
also develop a two-stage estimation procedure that accounts for both the extensive (decision 
to export from i to j) and the intensive (volume of exports conditional on exporting) margins 
of trade. Although this approach offers a better understanding of the determinants of trade 
flows, it provides biased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data (Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro 2009). The RESET test (Ramsey 1969) performed on our data suggests 
the presence of heteroskedasticity in our sample. Therefore, to avoid biased estimation results, 
the Poisson estimator suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is used. The Poisson 
estimator provides estimates that are comparable to elasticity estimates from the standard 
linear-in-logs specification and corrects for heteroskedasticity in the error term. The 
performance of the Poisson estimator has been challenged in the literature on the grounds that 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) do not consider the case in which the dependent variable 
has a substantial proportion of zero values. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) show 
that even in the presence of many zeroes, the Poisson estimator is well behaved. In addition, 
our data are aggregated, which reduces the proportion of zeroes in our sample.  
Second, although and  are not completely disconnected from the 
two GDPs of i and j, respectively, the latter are crude approximations at best, raising issues 
about the validity of simple gravity specifications and results. The specification used here is 
more consistent with theory and involves the use of fixed effects by importer, exporter, and 
year (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Feenstra 2004). The fixed effects incorporate size effects as 
in gravity as well as other origin and destination determinants, including the price and the 
number of varieties of the exporting country and the demand size and price index (often 
referred to as a remoteness term) of the importing country.  
Third, trade costs enter the (unobserved) price level in each country. Without 
correction, the omitted variable can be correlated with trade-cost variables on the right-hand 
σ−1
itit
pn 1−σ
jttj
PY
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side. Following Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects 
are used.  
Fourth, EIAs and their particular clauses, such as harmonization, may be endogenous 
to trade flows. One approach to address this issue consists of using instrumental-variable 
techniques. Critical to this approach is the selection of instruments, which should be 
correlated with the probability of an EIA between two countries but uncorrelated with their 
bilateral trade flows. In their study using disaggregated data, Chen and Mattoo (2008) use 
standards harmonization in adjacent industries (i.e., industries classified in the same two-digit 
sector) as an instrument. Because our focus is on aggregated trade flows, the definition of 
instruments is more complex in our case. As an alternative to IV estimation, we rely on 
country-pair fixed effects to control for the potential endogeneity of EIAs and their clauses, 
following Baier and Bergstrand (2007) or Anderson and Yotov (2011). Although this 
approach may not eliminate all of the potential endogeneity bias, it is intuitively plausible that 
standards harmonization, particularly on regional standards, correlates positively with trade 
flows, biasing coefficients upward. Our key result is that harmonization depresses South-
South trade, and harmonization on regional standards fails to raise North-South trade. This 
result is unlikely to be driven by endogeneity bias. Furthermore, as highlighted by Helpman et 
al. (2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2012), firm heterogeneity may bias aggregate trade flow 
results and affect our empirical results. However, the decision by firms to enter markets is 
likely dominated by cross-sectional variation. Therefore, the inclusion of country-pair fixed 
effects in our estimations should largely account for this potential firm-heterogeneity bias. 
Finally, another source of bias may arise from the potential dependence between some 
EIAs. Although the diversity in TBT harmonization clauses included in EIAs suggests that 
this source of bias is limited, this issue is controlled for by clustering errors. For North-South 
trade and because our main variables of interest vary by country-pair, errors are clustered at 
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the country-pair level. For South-South trade, our main variables vary by exporter-year, and a 
clustering at the exporter-year level is preferred.  
Our focus in this paper is on the trade effect of standards harmonization included in 
North-South EIAs on Southern countries’ trade. This focus leads us to consider both South-
South and North-South trade. Accordingly, our sample of relations between all i and all j is 
split into two sub-samples corresponding, respectively, to South-South and North-South trade 
relations. The South-South sub-sample consists of exports from the South (country i) to the 
South (country j), whereas the North-South sub-sample includes exports from the South 
(country i) to the North (country j).
3
  
Furthermore, we need to disentangle the impact of a North-South EIA as such from 
the inclusion of provisions on technical regulations. That is, we have a “treatment” that can 
take on different intensities and forms: just EIA, EIA with standards harmonization, or EIA 
with harmonization on regional or international standards (figure 1). The different treatments 
(presence of an EIA, harmonization of standards, and promotion of specific standards) are 
included consecutively in the estimations. Thus, the harmonization of standards is conditional 
on the presence of an EIA, and the promotion of specific standards is conditional on the 
presence of an EIA and the harmonization of standards. 
                                                 
3
 In addition, a Chow test suggests that estimated coefficients on both sub-samples differ significantly and 
confirms this divide. North-North relations are dropped from our sample. The list of Northern and Southern 
countries is given in Appendix (Table A.1). 
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Figure 1. The Different Steps of Integration 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in the text. 
 
Accordingly, a set of dummies defined as follows is introduced: 
North-South trade relations  
Base treatment: 
- a “North-South EIA” dummy NS
ijtA  is defined and equal to one when i and j are 
members of a common regional North-South agreement at t (0 otherwise).  
Treatment intensity/form:  
- For country pairs with a common North-South EIA ( 1NSijtA = ), a second dummy ijtH  
is defined and is equal to one when the EIA includes a TBT provision involving the 
harmonization of technical regulations (0 otherwise). 
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- Finally, for country pairs with a common North-South EIA with a harmonization 
provision ( 1NSijtA =  and ijtH =1), a pair of dummies ( ),ijt ijtR I  is defined, where 
1ijtR = if the agreement promotes the use of regional standards only, and 1ijtI =  if it 
promotes international ones instead. The two conditions are mutually exclusive, so 
0ijt ijtR I = . 
 
Based on this, for North-South trade, our estimation equation is 
(2) 
ijtijt
SN
ijijijijjtitijt
dx ηααααδδ )colonyclangcbordlnexp(
4321
βT++++++= ,   
where ijtx  is the dollar value of country j’s imports from country i in year t, itδ  and jtδ are, 
respectively, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, ijd  is the bilateral distance, and 
cbordij, clangij, and colonyij are dummies controlling, respectively, for common border, 
language, and past colonial links. Treatment effects are subsumed by the vector [ ]ijtijtijtijtijtNS IRHA ,,,=T . Finally, )exp(u ijtijt ≡η , with uijt as the error term.  
 
When dyadic country-pair fixed effects ( ijδ ) are included in the estimation, time-
invariant dyadic controls such as distance and common language are absorbed, and equation 
(2) becomes 
(3) exp( )NSijt it jt ij ijt ijtx δ δ δ η= + + + T β . 
 
South-South trade relations  
Here, our regressor of interest (to test for trade-diversion and trade-deflection effects on 
South-South trade) is whether the importing and/or the exporting countries have signed an 
EIA with a Northern country at t.  
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Base treatment:  
- A pair of dummies ( ),NS NSit jtA A is defined and equal to one when the (Southern) 
exporter or importer has an EIA with a Northern country (a North-South agreement) 
and 0 otherwise.  
Treatment intensity/form: 
- For Southern exporters with a North-South agreement ( 1NSitA = ), an additional 
dummy itH  is defined and is equal to one when that agreement has a harmonization 
clause. 
Other (“parallel”) treatment: 
- South-South agreements are controlled for by defining a “South-South EIA” dummy 
SS
ijtA  equal to one when i and j are members of a common regional South-South 
agreement at t (0 otherwise).  
 
In the case of South-South trade, because our variable of interest (standards 
harmonization with the North for the exporting country) is country and time variant, country 
fixed effects and year dummies cannot be interacted. As a result, importing country, exporting 
country, and year fixed effects are included separately in all regressions. As mentioned by 
Berger et al. (2013), country and time year fixed effects may be insufficient to control for 
omitted factors that vary simultaneously by time and country. However, Berger et al. (2013) 
show that the potential bias is limited. Their results remain unchanged when they use pre-
trends and pre-intervention fixed effects and control for observable characteristics. In our 
estimations, countries’ GDPs are added to control for the time variation in trading partners’ 
demand and supply.  
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Our estimated equation is therefore as follows:  
(4) 
ijtijt
SS
ijijijij
jtittjiijt
d
x ηαααα ααδδδ )colonyclangcbordln        GDPlnGDPlnexp(
6543
21
γT+++++ ++++=   
where , , , ,SS SS NS NSijt ijt it jt it jtA A A H H =  T .  
 
When dyadic country-pair fixed effects ( ijδ ) are included in the estimation, time-
invariant country-pair controls (e.g., distance, common language) are dropped, as are 
importing country and exporting country fixed effects. Equation (4) becomes 
(5)  )GDPlnGDPlnexp( .
21 ijtijt
SS
jtitijtijt
x ηααδδ γT++++= . 
 
4.2 Data 
The trade data come from the BACI database developed by the CEPII.
4
 Our dependent 
variable is the total bilateral imports of country j from country i in year t ( ijtx ). Note that in 
BACI, flows are reconciled, and the value is equal to exports from i to j in t. In BACI, the 
values are FOB. Our analysis covers the period 1990–2006 (except for some newly 
independent countries in Central Asia and Africa).  
Countries’ GDPs are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Transport costs 
are measured using the bilateral distance between both partners (dij). These distances are 
extracted from the CEPII database.
5
 In addition, a dummy variable for contiguity (cbordij) that 
                                                 
4
 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm. This database uses original procedures to harmonize the United 
Nations COMTRADE data (evaluation of the quality of country declarations to average mirror flows, evaluation 
of cost, insurance, and freight rates to reconcile import and export declarations). 
5
 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. These distances are calculated as the sum of the distances 
between the largest cities of both countries, weighted by the share of the population living in each city (Mayer 
and Zignago, 2011). 
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equals one if both countries share a border is included. Bilateral trade can also be fostered by 
countries’ cultural proximity. This proximity is controlled for by introducing two dummies 
that are equal to one if both partners share an official language (clangij) or if they have had a 
colonial relationship or a common colonizer (colonyij), respectively. The data come from the 
above-mentioned CEPII database. 
The last step is to specify the variables used to quantify the effect on South-South and 
North-South trade of incorporating provisions on standards harmonization in a North-South 
EIA. The full list of North-South EIAs considered in our exercise is provided in Appendix 
(Table A.2) and covers 43 EIAs. We use the template provided by Piermartini and Budetta 
(2009) and update it by adding some recent North-South EIAs that they did not review. For 
each EIA, our focus is on provisions on technical regulations. According to the WTO 
definition, compliance with a technical regulation is mandatory. To build their template, 
Piermartini and Budetta (2009) focus on the legal text of the Agreements
6
 and scrutinize the 
wording. Expressions inviting parties to “bridge the gap,” “reduce divergence,” or “make 
compatible” their standards and technical regulations indicate that the policy adopted is 
harmonization.  
Before turning to estimation results, we briefly report descriptive statistics showing the 
expansion of North-South EIAs over the 1990–2006 period. These statistics provide the 
number of North-South EIAs and the share of Northern imports from the South covered by 
these EIAs in 1990, 1999, and 2006 (Table 1). The number of EIAs expanded from four in 
                                                 
6
 The database on EIAs maintained by Baier and Bergstrand (http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr/) also provides 
detailed and useful information on EIAs and links to the legal text of the Agreements. Similarly, Horn et al. 
(2009) study the legal text to investigate whether the areas (technical regulations as well as customs 
administration, export taxes, public procurement, and labour market regulations) covered by the Agreements fall 
under or outside the current mandate of the WTO. We thank A. Sapir for providing data. We tried a cross-check 
with our data. Unfortunately, their database does not provide a detailed analysis of the content of each area. 
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1990 to 43 in 2006. The share of Northern imports from the South covered by an EIA reached 
19.5% in 2006. Furthermore, an increasing number of EIAs include TBT provisions involving 
the harmonization of technical regulations (21 North-South EIAs in 2006). A few EIAs 
promote the use of regional standards only (six in 2006), and the trade coverage of these EIAs 
is approximately 3.8%. Finally, one may note that the trade coverage of EIAs promoting the 
use of international standards (alone or in addition to regional standards) decreased between 
1999 and 2006. 
 
Table 1. North-South EIAs and Trade# Coverage 
 
 
   1990 1999 2006 
 Nb Trade 
coverage 
(%) 
Nb Trade 
coverage 
(%)  
Nb Trade 
coverage 
(%) 
EIAs 4 0.4 12 15.8 43 19.5 
EIAs with harmonization of technical regulations 0 0 5 14.2 21 15.7 
  Promotion of the use of regional standards only 0 0 2 2.1 6 3.8 
  Promotion of the use of international standards 
(alone or in addition to regional ones) 
0 0 2 12.1 12 11.8 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in the text. 
Note:
 #
: Northern imports from the South. 
 
 
5. The results 
As emphasized above, standards harmonization in North-South EIAs is expected to have 
distinct effects on South-South vs. North-South trade.  
5.1 South-South trade 
This section analyzes the influence of standards harmonization in North-South EIAs 
on bilateral trade between Southern countries and disentangles trade-diversion effects from 
trade-deflection ones.  
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Traditional trade-diversion effects may arise from the simple elimination of intra-bloc 
tariffs, especially if the Southern partner has high MFN tariffs. These effects are reinforced in 
rare cases where the North-South agreement is a customs union (CU), causing the Southern 
country to raise its external tariff. The only example of a North-South CU in our database is 
Turkey with the EU.
 
With the exception of agricultural products, the low level of EU tariffs 
guarantees that this effect has not played a substantial role. Traditional trade-diversion effects 
would be picked up in our specification by a dummy variable marking bilateral flows where 
the importer belongs to a North-South EIA (“N-S EIA for the importer”).  
The trade-deflection effects may come from changes in the Southern exporter’s trade 
patterns following its membership in a North-South EIA and the resulting standards 
harmonization. These effects would be picked up by a dummy variable marking bilateral 
flows where the exporter belongs to a North-South EIA with standards harmonization because 
it is the exporter who would suffer from additional production costs as a result of the 
harmonization. This dummy is labelled “N-S EIA & standards harmonization with the North 
for the exporter”.  
 The results are reported in Table 2. We first estimate the determinants of bilateral 
flows between Southern countries without controlling for the potential existence of EIAs 
between Southern countries and Northern partners (columns 1-2). The trade impact of North-
South EIAs and standards harmonization on South-South trade is then investigated (columns 
3-4). Column (3) tests for potential diversion effects by investigating the impact on South-
South trade of the signature by either the importing and/or the exporting Southern countries of 
an EIA with the North. Column (4) examines the trade impact linked to the harmonization of 
technical regulations in the exporting country. The last three columns report the results of 
robustness checks replicating the estimation of column (4), which is our preferred 
specification. 
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Table 2. South-South Trade 
Specification Poisson maximum likelihood 
Dependent variable Bilateral imports between Southern countries 
Trade flows All products Manufacturing All products 
Years 1990-2006 1990-2006 (every 3 years) 1990-2006
 
(with 1-year lag)
# 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln GDP exporter 0.42
a
 
(0.07) 
0.41
a
 
(0.06) 
0.37
a
 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.19
c
 
(0.11) 
Ln GDP importer 0.61
a
 
(0.09) 
0.58
a
 
(0.09) 
0.56
a
 
(0.09) 
0.60
a
 
(0.09) 
0.64
a
 
(0.09) 
0.70
a
 
(0.11) 
0.60
a
 
(0.09) 
Ln distance -0.79
a
 
(0.05) 
      
Common border 0.71
a
 
(0.11) 
      
Common language 0.47
a
 
(0.10) 
      
Past common colonizer 0.23
c
 
(0.12) 
      
South-South EIA 0.06 
(0.12) 
0.41
a
 
(0.07) 
0.42
a
 
(0.07) 
0.30
a
 
(0.06) 
0.28
a
 
(0.07) 
0.36
a
 
(0.14) 
0.24
a
 
(0.07) 
N-S EIA for the exporter   -0.20
a 
(0.04) 
    
N-S EIA for the importer   -0.12
b 
(0.06) 
-0.11
a 
(0.04) 
-0.13
a 
(0.04) 
-0.18
a 
(0.06) 
-0.16
b 
(0.07) 
N-S EIA & stds harmonization 
with the North for the exporter 
 
 
 
-0.22
b 
(0.10) 
-0.18
b 
(0.08) 
-0.51
a 
(0.16) 
-0.24
c 
(0.13) 
Observations 296,376 245,069 245,069 24,803 24,151 7,804 22,109 
Log pseudo-likelihood -16,296.97 -9,606.60 -9,592.48 -1,061.93 -951.93 -254.89 -923.95 
FE exporter Yes       
FE importer Yes       
FE year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE dyad  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.  
Note: Constant and fixed effects not reported. Country fixed effects could not be interacted with year dummies in this table because standards harmonization variables are country-
time variant. Robust standard errors (exporter-year clustered) in parentheses. 
a
, 
b
, 
c
 denote significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In columns (4)-(7), the sample 
24 
 
is restricted to the sub-sample of Southern exporter countries with an EIA with a Northern partner. 
# 
: The last column reports the total effect of EIA and harmonization by summing 
the values of the coefficients on the dummy for the concurrent year and on the lagged dummy. Standard errors are computed with the Delta method. 
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In the first column, countries’ GDPs have a positive and significant impact on trade. 
Distance has a negative and significant impact on bilateral flows, whereas a common border 
and common language increase trade (p<0.01 for contiguity and common language). Finally, 
the dummy variable controlling for the existence of a South-South EIA is not significant.  
Column (2) controls for the endogeneity issue by introducing country-pair fixed 
effects. Following this introduction, importer and exporter fixed effects are dropped because 
of collinearity. Interestingly, the dummy variable controlling for the existence of a South-
South EIA becomes significant, suggesting that South-South integration—long characterized 
by low complementarities and little trade creation—has significant trade effects in our sample 
period.  
Columns (3) shows that the signature by the importing and/or exporting Southern 
countries of an EIA with the North tends to reduce trade flows with other Southern partners 
(p<0.01 for the exporting and importing countries). This result suggests the presence of trade 
diversion effects. However, whether such effects are of the traditional kind or conditional on 
the presence of standards harmonization is not controlled at that stage.  
Column (4) controls for the harmonization of technical regulations in the North-South 
agreement signed by the exporting country. This estimation is our preferred one because it 
disentangles the traditional effects of EIAs from harmonization ones. Because our aim is to 
measure the impact of standards harmonization, our sample is restricted to observations for 
which the exporting country has signed an EIA with the North. For the importing country, we 
still observe the pure trade diversion effect induced by better access to the Northern market, 
as in column (3). The results for the exporting country are now different. The signature of an 
EIA involving the harmonization of its standards with the North has a negative and significant 
impact on its trade with other Southern countries, and the magnitude of the impact is similar 
to the one appearing in the previous column when it is not interacted with the harmonization 
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dummy (if both are introduced simultaneously, the effect of standards harmonization absorbs 
that of a NS EIA for the exporter).  
This result highlights the presence of the type of trade deflection discussed in this 
paper. Our explanation is as follows. Standards harmonization is costly and raises the price of 
affected products, possibly pricing them out of other Southern countries. With a price 
elasticity of demand equal to -2, the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of the “average” NS 
harmonization would be close to 10%.
7
 That is, a Southern country signing an EIA with a 
Northern partner involving the harmonization of technical regulations would suffer a negative 
competitiveness shock on other Southern markets equivalent to a 10% export tax, which is a 
substantial effect. 
The last three columns of Table 2 investigate the robustness of our results by 
replicating the estimation of column (4). Column (5) shows that our results are unaffected by 
the exclusion of agricultural products, which are less subject to TBTs than are manufactured 
ones. Column (6) controls for the potential bias associated with fixed effects estimation on 
data pooled over consecutive years (Anderson and Yotov 2011). To do so, only the years 
1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006 are used. The conclusions remain unchanged. Our 
third robustness check addresses the lagged trade effects of trade agreements and TBT 
harmonization. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) showed that the effect of EIAs cannot be fully 
captured in the year of their formation because most of them have phase-in periods. We 
therefore allow for gradual phasing-in of EIA and standard harmonization by including one 
lag for these variables in the estimation. The results are presented in column (7). We report 
                                                 
7
 The ad valorem equivalent is [exp(β)-1]/ε, where β is the estimated coefficient and ε is the price elasticity of 
import demand (in algebraic form, i.e., negative). The average price elasticity of imports over all goods and 
countries is estimated by Kee et al. (2008) as -3.12 at HS6 and -1.1 at ISIC3.  
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the total trade effect by summing coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged dummies, 
with standard errors computed using the Delta method. The results are unaffected. 
Our results suggest that the trade deflection observed here may be at least partly a quality 
upgrading effect. As Southern exporters adopt Northern standards, they move up the quality 
ladder and redirect their exports toward markets with richer consumers. However, the 
aggregated data used here does not allow us to further investigate this issue because unit 
values (a proxy for quality) must be computed at the very detailed level of the product 
classification. 
 
 
5.2 North-South trade 
The flip side of the coin is Northern imports from the South (Table 3). The first two 
columns follow a standard approach in the literature and test for the mean effect of North-
South agreements on North-South trade without distinguishing between forms of integration. 
The first uses separate year, importer, and exporter fixed effects, and the second uses 
importer-year and exporter-year as well as country-pair fixed effects. 
Columns (3)-(8) focus on country pairs that signed an EIA. These columns test for the 
effect of deeper integration with the introduction of the dummies described in the previous 
section. Column (3) introduces the harmonization dummy, and columns (4)-(8) distinguish 
further between regional and international standards.   
The overall fit of the regressions is consistent with what is found in the literature. 
Regarding traditional covariates (column 1), distance negatively influences bilateral imports, 
whereas countries’ GDP and common border have a positive effect on trade. The cultural 
proximity variables suggest that imports are higher if both countries share the same language. 
The existence of a past colonial relationship has no significant influence. Coefficients on 
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gravity variables estimated on North-South trade differ somewhat in magnitude from those 
estimated on South-South trade, justifying our strategy of separate estimation by sub-sample 
(South-South and North-South trade). 
Regarding EIA variables, the interest of columns (1) and (2) is to highlight how the 
replacement of time-invariant importer and exporter effects by interacted importer-year, 
exporter-year, and country-pair effects affects estimates. The positive estimate in (1) becomes 
insignificant in (2), suggesting both that there is a strong omitted-variable bias in the former 
and that the latter goes some way toward correcting it.
8
  
Column (3) shows that the effect of standards harmonization, conditional on the 
existence of an EIA, is positive but not significant. Column (4) suggests that harmonization to 
regional standards is trade-impeding, whereas harmonization to international standards is 
trade-enhancing. Thus, the detrimental effect of harmonization on North-South trade seems to 
be driven by regional standards only; when harmonization promotes the use of international 
standards, it vanishes.  
These results suggest that the worst type of agreement for a Southern country, in terms 
of trade with the North, is a North-South EIA involving the harmonization of technical 
regulations and promoting the use of regional standards. Because Southern exporters have to 
comply with Northern standards with or without harmonization, this is unlikely to be a trade-
barrier effect. Instead, the combination of our results on South-South and North-South trade 
suggests that harmonization on regional standards restricts access to the Southern partner for 
out-of-bloc Southern exporters (this is implied by the coefficient on the dummy marking NS 
agreement for the importer in Table 2). This protection effect raises the profitability of 
                                                 
8
 Lagged EIA effects are also investigated by running a specification including the simultaneous EIA variable 
and its four-year lag. The estimated coefficient on the lagged EIA variable as well as the total effect 
(simultaneous and lagged) are insignificant. Results are available upon request. 
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domestic sales for Southern producers relative to exporting to the North. As a result, they 
export less and sell more at home.
9
  
As stressed in Section 3, most of the EIAs containing a harmonization clause and 
included in our database involve the EU. Accordingly, it is worth focusing on EU importers 
(column 5). The results are similar to the results in column (4). Thus, the negative trade effect 
of regional harmonization comes mostly from the high regulatory standards imposed by the 
EU. For the international harmonization, the magnitude of the coefficient in column (5) is 
slightly smaller than the one in column (4), but the difference is not significant. This last 
result is not surprising given that regardless of the importing country, international 
harmonization implies the adoption of the same level of regulation.  
Columns (6)-(8) show three robustness checks. Column 6 first restricts the sample to 
manufactured products to disentangle the effect of TBT and SPS regulations (SPS are sanitary 
and phytosanitary regulations applied mainly to agri-food products; TBT are technical 
regulations that can be applied to all manufactured products). Because the results in columns 
(4) and (6) are very similar, excluding agricultural products from our sample leaves estimates 
unaffected, suggesting that non-sanitary technical regulations matter in EIAs. 
Column (7) uses only three-year interval data (1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 
2006) to avoid the potential bias associated with fixed effects estimations on data pooled over 
consecutive years. The results are unaffected. 
Finally, column (8) includes a lag in the estimation. The results are again unaffected. 
Harmonization to regional standards is trade-restricting, whereas harmonization to 
international standards is trade-enhancing.  
                                                 
9
 By the same token, Northern producers also enjoy protected access to the Southern market, which encourages 
North-South flows. Our estimates suggest that the trade-inhibiting effect on South-North flows more than offsets 
the encouragement effect on North-South flows. 
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Table 3. North-South Trade 
Specification Poisson maximum likelihood 
Dependent variable Bilateral imports of the Northern country from the Southern partner 
Trade flows All products Manufacturing All products 
Years 1990-2006 1990-2006 (every 3 years) 1990-2006
 
(with 1-year lag)
#
 
Sample of importers All EU All  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln GDP exporter 0.71
a
 
(0.08) 
       
Ln GDP importer 0.51
a
 
(0.09) 
       
Ln distance -0.61
a
 
(0.10) 
       
Common border 1.37
a
 
(0.33) 
       
Common language 0.42
a
 
(0.12) 
       
Past colonial links 0.10 
(0.19) 
       
North-South EIA 0.36
a
 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
      
N-S EIA with standards 
harmonization 
  0.06 
(0.08) 
     
N-S EIA with stds harmonization 
& promotion of regional stds 
   -0.20
b
 
(0.08) 
-0.19
b
 
(0.09) 
-0.22
b
 
(0.09) 
-0.31
b
 
(0.14) 
-0.25
b
 
(0.09) 
N-S EIA with stds harmonization 
& promotion of international stds 
   0.52
a
 
(0.15) 
0.36
a
 
(0.13) 
0.55
a
 
(0.14) 
0.70
a
 
(0.15) 
0.57
a
 
(0.14) 
Observations 49,522 52,448 1,731 1,731 1,209 1,731 683 1,702 
Log pseudolikelihood -13,618.21 -10396.75 -889.30 -889.23 -643.31 -839.91 -366.30 -887.09 
FE exporter Yes        
FE importer Yes        
FE year Yes        
FE exporter × year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE importer × year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE dyad  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.  
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Note: Constant and fixed effects not reported. Robust standard errors (importer-exporter clustered) in parentheses. 
a
, 
b
 denote significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively. In 
columns (3)-(8), the sample is restricted to the sub-sample of Southern exporter countries with an EIA with a Northern partner. 
# 
: The last column reports the total effect of EIA and 
harmonization by summing the values of the coefficients on the dummy for the concurrent year and on the lagged dummy. Standard errors are computed with the Delta method. 
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5.3 Product-level estimation 
To test that our conclusions based on aggregated trade flows are not spurious, we run 
product-level estimations. These regressions analyze whether the aggregate changes observed 
in North-South and South-South trade when standards are harmonized are driven by products 
affected by NTM harmonization.  
Product information is usually not available in the legal texts of EIAs. Therefore, to 
perform this investigation, we rely on the NTM dataset used by Disdier et al. (2008), which is 
relevant for our sample period. The dataset provides all NTMs notified by WTO members at 
the WTO up to 2004 at the HS6-digit level. Our estimation strategy is as follows:  
- Our sample is restricted to the sub-sample of Southern exporter countries with an 
EIA with a Northern partner. 
- For North-South trade, a dummy is defined and equal to one for HS6 products 
affected by at least one NTM in the Northern country. This dummy is interacted 
with our two main variables of interest: “N-S EIA with standards harmonization & 
promotion of regional standards” and “N-S EIA with standards harmonization & 
promotion of regional standards”; 
- For South-South trade, a dummy is defined and equal to one for HS6 products 
affected by at least one NTM in the North. It is interacted with our main variable of 
interest: “N-S EIA & standards harmonization with the North for the exporter”. 
Estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are reported in Table 4.
10
 Column (1) 
presents the results for South-South trade, and the coefficients for North-South trade are 
reported in column (2). The results confirm and strengthen our previous findings. For North-
South trade, our estimated coefficient is negative and significant when harmonization takes 
                                                 
10
 To save space, only estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are reported. Detailed results are available 
from the authors. 
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place on regional standards but positive and significant when it takes place on international 
ones. For South-South trade, a negative and significant coefficient is obtained on the 
interaction term, suggesting that the deflection effects are at play for products affected by a 
NTM and for which standards are harmonized with the North.  
 
 
Table 4. Product-level Estimations 
 
Specification Poisson maximum likelihood 
Trade flows South-South trade North-South trade 
Dependent variable Bilateral imports between 
Southern countries 
Bilateral imports of the Northern 
country from the Southern partner 
Products HS6 products 
Years 2004 
Model (1) (2) 
N-S EIA for the importer -0.79
a
 
(0.28) 
 
Product NTM x N-S EIA & stds harm. with 
the North for the exporter 
-1.01
a
 
(0.21) 
 
   
Product NTM x N-S EIA with stds harm. & 
promotion of regional stds 
 -0.68
a
 
(0.18) 
Product NTM x N-S EIA with stds harm. & 
promotion of international stds 
 0.97
a
 
(0.09) 
Observations 9,944,060 873,810 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,023.01 -1,456.94 
FE exporter Yes  
FE importer Yes  
FE dyad  Yes 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in the text. 
Note: The sample for South-South trade is restricted to the sub-sample of Southern exporter countries with an 
EIA with a Northern partner. Robust standard errors (importer-exporter clustered) in parentheses. 
a
, denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of standards harmonization promoted 
in North-South EIAs on the trade integration of Southern countries in the world economy. We 
distinguish the impact on South-South trade versus North-South trade. Our results suggest 
that deep North-South integration involving standards harmonization may be harmful for 
South-South trade. Our analysis shows that South-South trade is negatively impacted by 
harmonization and that North-South trade is negatively affected when the harmonization is on 
regional standards. Most of the action takes place in relation to regional agreements signed by 
the EU with developing countries. Our findings confirm Piermartini and Budetta’s (2009) 
intuition: harmonization on a regional basis may lock countries into some EIAs and reinforces 
hub-and-spoke trade structures. These results call for further research, especially at the sector 
level. One may also explore whether differences in terms of trade impact are observable 
between the developing and least developed countries. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. List of Countries Included in the Sample 
Northern countries: 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
 
 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
 
 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Southern countries: 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Brunei Darussalam 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 
 
 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
East Timor  
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Republic of 
Kuwait 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova, Rep. of 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Qatar 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
 
 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania, United Rep. 
of 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in the text. 
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Table A.2. List of North-South EIAs Included in the Study 
 
Australia – Papua New Guinea (PATCRA) 
Canada – Chile  
Canada – Costa Rica  
Canada – Israel 
Dominican Republic – Central America – 
United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) 
EC – Albania  
EC – Algeria  
EC – Chile  
EC – Egypt  
EC – Israel  
EC – Jordan  
EC – Lebanon  
EC – Mexico   
EC – Morocco  
EC – South Africa  
EC – Syria  
EC – Tunisia  
EC – Turkey  
EFTA – Chile  
EFTA – Israel 
EFTA – Jordan  
EFTA – Korea, Republic of  
EFTA – Mexico  
EFTA – Morocco  
EFTA – Singapore  
EFTA – Tunisia  
EFTA – Turkey  
Japan – Malaysia  
Japan – Mexico  
Japan – Singapore 
New Zealand – Singapore  
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Singapore – Australia  
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) 
Thailand – Australia  
Thailand – New Zealand 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership 
US – Bahrain   
US – Chile  
US – Israel  
US – Jordan  
US – Morocco  
US – Singapore  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in the text. 
 
 
